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CCSI Briefing Note 1

Jacky Mandelbaum, Salli Anne Swartz and John Hauert1,2
July 2014

Key Points
1

Review mechanisms can play
a role in managing the
relationship between the
parties.

There are different triggers
2 required for parties to start
discussions on modifying the
terms of the contract.

Periodic review in natural resource contracts

This brief looks at the use of requirements in the extractive industries for
investors and the government to meet at regular intervals to consider
The mechanisms identified
3 lack strong obligations on the whether the terms of the agreement between them require adjustment.
parties to do more than
Through reviewing existing agreements, the brief considers how the
discuss potential changes.
requirements have been expressed to-date and their role as a tool to
maintain the relationship between the parties. Finally, the brief suggests
a new approach to the drafting of these mechanisms.
A new approach may be to
4 provide objective criteria in the
contract at the outset, for the
parties to determine whether a 1. Introduction
renegotiation should occur and
if so, the parameters of the
Large-scale investments in extractive
renegotiation.
industries can be plagued by demands
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longer - means that it can be difficult
to predict at the outset what
conditions will exist over the course of
the investment. It is very likely that
for renegotiation, sometimes leading to
the circumstances at the time the
arbitration or litigation and causing a
original agreement is entered into will
breakdown in the relationship between
change, driven for example by
the host country and the investor. The
resource cycles or a changing
nature of these investments - longpolitical environment.
term, lasting for 20 to 50 years or
1
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the issue of the parties’ obligations to modify the
contract (Section 4). Section 5 identifies problems that
arise in practice under Periodic Review Mechanism
and Section 6 outlines a new approach to the review of
contracts – providing objective criteria for the parties to
determine whether a renegotiation should occur and if
so, the parameters of the renegotiation. The final
section will look at strengths and weaknesses of the
Periodic and At Request Review Mechanisms, and
suggest ways to strengthen obligations if the parties so
decided (Section 7).

As the balance of risks and benefits changes, parties
request modifications to the terms and conditions of
the investment . Accordingly, mechanisms are needed
in these agreements to smooth the process of dealing
with the inevitability of changing circumstances.
“Periodic Review Mechanisms”, provisions that
formally require parties to meet at particular intervals
to review the terms of the contract or license and
consider whether circumstances have changed since
the parties’ initial agreement, are one such
mechanism. Contractually provided periodic reviews
give the parties an opportunity to negotiate and
readjust contractual provisions. Worst case scenarios
often arise out of long term frustration by one or
several of the parties which can result in expropriations
with years of ensuing litigation or international
arbitration. Provided that the parties take advantage of
the opportunity to renegotiate terms, the contract terms
and conditions can be readjusted before the parties
are so desperate and frustrated that the investor
decides to stop work or the Government decides to
terminate permits and concessions

2. Review mechanisms – Overview
Annex 1 sets out clauses containing review
mechanisms from two contracts (Mining Contract 2
and Oil Contract 10). Each contains three types of
review process (which are not mutually exclusive),
broadly described as follows:
a. A regular meeting between the parties, once
every five (5) years, to discuss in good faith
whether any modifications are required to the
terms of the contract in light of “any substantial
changes in circumstance” (in Oil Contract 10, this
periodic meeting only occurs if a party requests it
with 45 days’ notice). This review process is
referred to in this brief as “Periodic Review”, as it
envisages a meeting between the parties at
regular intervals.
b. An “on-demand” meeting, if either party makes a
request on the basis that a particular event
(Trigger Event) has occurred such that the
contract requires modifications. In the examples
in Annex 1, the Trigger Event is a “Profound
Change of Circumstance” (PCC - described in
Section 3.2 below). The parties must meet to
determine whether a PCC has occurred, and if so
must discuss in good faith any changes required
to the contract. This review process is referred to
in this brief as “Trigger-At-Request-Review”, as
the meeting may take place at any time upon a
party’s request, but the parties only discuss
changes to the contract if they establish a
particular Trigger Event has occurred (i.e., PCC).
c. An “on-demand” meeting at any time that a party
requests, to discuss any matter “affecting the

However, our research does not suggest that Periodic
Review Mechanisms are widely used. Although forms
of such mechanisms have been included in contracts
as early as the 1970si, a review undertaken for the
purpose of this brief of publicly available extractive
industry contracts and of extractive industry
databasesii, identified such mechanisms only in
contracts published by the Liberia Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (LEITI)iii and the Model Mine
Development Agreement prepared by the International
Bar Association in 2011 (MMDA).iv With regard to the
legislative approach, Tanzania’s Mining Code is one
example (and the only one we found) of legislation that
contains such a mechanism.v The Periodic Review
Mechanisms in the Liberian contracts are broadly
representative of the examples in the MMDA and this
brief therefore analyzes the Liberian contracts in order
to better understand such mechanisms.vi
Although the focus of this brief is on Periodic Review
Mechanisms (Section 3), the fourth section will
consider mechanisms that are not initiated periodically
but at the request of one of the parties (At Request
Review Mechanisms), providing additional insight into
2

rights and obligations of the parties”. The parties
must discuss in good faith the matter raised. This
type of review process is referred to in this brief
as an “Automatic-At-Request-Review” as either
party can request it at any time without the need
to establish a Trigger Event.

3.1. Initiation of the Periodic Review
At pre-defined intervals over the course of the
investment, the parties are required to meet and
consult, with the aim of establishing whether or not a
Trigger Event has occurred. In all but one of the
Liberian Mining Contractsix, as well as in the two Oil
Contracts with Periodic Review Mechanisms, this
interval is five (5) years.x

These different review processes broadly represent
the procedures set forth in many of the contracts
reviewed herein, although each contract’s provisions
may vary slightly from the above provisions.

3.2. Trigger Event in Periodic Review
The Trigger Event is a crucial element of the Periodic
Review Mechanisms, because it starts the Modification
Process. In order for a Modification Process to take
place, the parties must agree that the Trigger Event
has occurred (which is not a given).

In the contracts reviewed, the “Review Process” can
be described by the following elements.
a. “Initiation of the Review” (3.1. and 4.1.) - in regular
meetings at defined intervals (3.1.) or in ad hoc
meetings at the request of one of them (4.1.), the
parties start the Review Process. The Review Process
does not necessarily lead to the parties actually
discussing changes to the contract.

Typically, the Trigger Event can only be inferred from
the Periodic Review Mechanisms. In these cases, it is
defined as “any substantial changes in
circumstances.”xi
Other contracts, however, are explicit in requiring a
Trigger Event and the event is defined in more detail;
in order for the Modification Process to begin the
parties must establish the occurrence of PCC.xii PCC is
generally defined as “such changes […] in the
economic conditions of the mineral and mining industry
worldwide or in Liberia, or such changes in the
economic, political or social circumstances existing in
Liberia specifically or elsewhere in the world at large
as to result in such a material and fundamental
alteration of the conditions, assumptions and bases
relied upon […] that the overall balance of equities and
benefits reasonably anticipated by them will no longer
as a practical manner be achievable.”

b. “Modification Process” (3.2., 3.3. and 4.2., 4.3.) - the
process during which the parties consider in good faith
and possibly make modifications to the contract, as
they agree is necessary in light of changed
circumstances.
c. “Trigger Event” (3.2. and 4.2.) - a particular
circumstance that the parties during the Review
Process must agree has occurred before they enter
into the Modification Process. In case the particular
circumstance has not occurred, the Review Process
stops and a Modification Process does not proceed.
For some At Request Review Mechanisms, it is not
necessary to establish a Trigger Event before
commencing the Modification Process.

If the parties fail to agree that the Trigger Event has
occurred, the Review Process terminates. The
contracts reviewed herein generally do not specify
whether (or not) the dispute over the existence of a
Trigger Event can or should be arbitrated. One
contract, Oil Contract 10, explicitly provides that the
clauses dealing with the Review Process will not be
subject to the contract’s dispute resolution provisions.
If the parties agree, the Modification Process begins

d. “Obligations of the parties” (3.3. and 4.3.) - the
parties’ obligations during the Modification Process,
typically to discuss the matters raised and to consider
in good faith possible changes to the contract.
3. Periodic Review in Liberian Contracts
In the contracts reviewed for this Brief, seven (7) out of
20 Mining Contractsvii and two (2) out of the 10 Oil
Contractsviii contain Periodic Review Mechanisms.
3

and the obligations of the parties relative to this
process are triggered.

“’good faith discussions’ and ‘consultation’ shall not
require a Party to agree to any modifications to this
Contract […].”xvi Given this emphasis on “good faith”
discussions, one area for further research would be to
analyze how arbitral tribunals treat such a duty and
what sort of obligations, if any, may be attached to
such duty.

3.3. Obligations of the Parties during the Periodic
Review
Typically, the obligation of one party to negotiate and
accept a proposal to modify the contract made by the
other party during the Modification Process is relatively
weak: parties are only required to enter into
discussions in good faith.xiii Exceptionally, contracts
provide sanctions to persuade the other party to
negotiate and accept proposals for modification from
the other party(ies). One contract provides that certain
tax exemptions expire unless they are renewed during
the Review Process:

4. At-Request-Review in Liberian Contracts
As illustrated in Section 2 above, in addition to the
Periodic Review Mechanisms, there are two types of
At Request Review Mechanisms in the Liberian
contracts. Both include a consultation that is initiated
by the request of one of the parties. However, some
clauses require the parties to establish that a Trigger
Event has occurred in order to start the Modification
Process when the parties meet (Trigger-At-RequestReview), while for others, the request itself sets the
Modification Process in motion (Automatic-At-RequestReview). The obligations of the parties to agree to any
modifications to the contract are weaker for the
Automatic-At-Request-Review than for the Trigger-AtRequest-Review.

“Not less than every 7 years after the
commencement of commercial production, the
parties shall consult together in Liberia for the
purpose of considering such changes in or
clarifications of this Agreement as either party
deems to be appropriate. Unless otherwise
renewed in writing by the Government prior to the
conclusion of each such consultation, the
exemptions provided in Section 16.4 shall expire
six (6) months after the date herein provided for the
commencement of such consultation [emphasis
added].” xiv

4.1. Initiation of the At Request Review
Both At-Request-Review Mechanisms can be initiated
by the request of one of the parties, at any time. In
Trigger-At-Request-Review mechanisms, the request
usually must be based on the perception by the party
making the request that a particular Trigger Event has
occurred (i.e., PCC) and in all cases the parties only
discuss changes to the contract if they agree that a
Trigger Event has occurred.

The examples of Periodic Review Mechanisms in the
MMDA also reveal relatively weak obligations, other
than one example, from an Australian land use
agreement (see Note iv), which provides that its
original terms will not continue if the parties do not
reach agreement during the Review Process.xv

4.2. Trigger Event in Trigger-At-Request-Review

In conclusion, the language used in the Periodic
Review Mechanisms clearly leaves consensus to
modify the contract solely in the hands of the parties. If
there is no agreement, no modification is made. The
only real obligation in the majority of contracts is the
duty to act in good faith while discussing and
considering possible modifications to the contract, but
most contracts do not provide parameters as to what
will be considered “good faith”. One contract that does
provide some guidance, emphasizes that there is no
requirement to make any changes, stipulating that:

In the Liberian contracts, the Trigger Event of the
Trigger-At-Request-Review Mechanism is always
defined as PCC. The definition of PCC differs slightly
between the Mining and Agriculture Contracts, on the
one hand and the Oil Contracts, on the other hand.
The Mining Contracts and Agriculture Contracts all
contain almost identical language to define PCC: “such
changes…in the economic conditions of the mineral
and mining industry worldwide or in Liberia, or such
changes in the economic, political or social
4

circumstances existing in Liberia specifically or
elsewhere in the world at large as to result in such a
material and fundamental alteration of the conditions,
assumptions and bases relied upon by the parties at
such base period that the overall balance of equities
and benefits reasonably anticipated by them will no
longer as a practical manner be achievable [emphasis
added].”xvii

exhaust much time, effort and initial goodwill arguing
over the pertinence and reality of the facts alleged by
one of the parties. Over time, goodwill often turns to
bad faith negotiations with allegations that the
numbers produced by one of the parties are not
trustworthy and cannot be relied upon as the basis to
renegotiate terms and conditions. The higher the
financial stakes, the more unlikely the parties will
agree that events have resulted in a grave
disequilibrium in the contract conditions.

The Oil Contracts, however, refer to changes in
“economic conditions” and then more broadly to
changes, without any limitation to changes in the
“economic, political or social circumstances”: “such
changes in the economic conditions of the petroleum
industry world wide or in Liberia or such changes that
result in such a material and fundamental alteration of
the conditions and assumptions relied upon by the
Parties at the Effective Date of this Contract […] to the
effect that the overall balance of the equities and
benefits reasonably anticipated by the Parties will no
longer be achievable [emphasis added].” There is only
one exception to this pattern in the Oil Contracts,
found in the most recent contract from 2013, which is
similar to the Mining and Agriculture Contracts.xviii

The parties use many arguments to justify the status
quo, depending upon which party has benefited from
the alleged change in circumstances.
The investor which benefits from a windfall profit often
will argue against a renegotiation requested by the
Government by stating that the sudden rise in prices of
the commodity (for example) was foreseeable in long
term contracts and that the new-found profit is a fair
return for the assumed project risk. Moreover, it will
argue that since it pays more taxes (if such is the
case), the Government benefits from the increased tax
revenue.

5. Issues encountered in practice

If the issue is a prolonged investor loss as opposed to
a windfall profit, the investor often will argue that
unforeseeable geological challenges or a drop in the
commodity prices (for example) makes its investment
worthless or much less valuable to it thereby setting
the scene for a work stoppage to force negotiations.
Similarly, the same argument can be made in the case
of Government-initiated modifications to the tax regime
in the absence of freezing or stabilization clauses. In
response to commodity price decreases or geological
challenges, the Government can argue that a sharp
rise or fall in commodity prices is foreseeable (even if it
is forced to admit that the timing and extent of the
variations in price are not) and that the investor
assumed the risk of geological challenges.

As this review indicates, many Periodic Review
clauses have very broad and imprecise wording. This
gives rise to disagreements over whether or not the
circumstances alleged by one party can justify a
renegotiation or whether or not a Trigger Event has
occurred. Thus, instead of negotiating, for example,
new financial terms and work schedules, the parties

In order to mitigate or eliminate Government-initiated
modifications in the tax regime, investors most often
require tax stabilization which affords foreseeability at
least for one of the elements used to calculate the
return on investment (ROI). However, such
stabilization does not address all of the other variables
in long-term extractive industry contracts.

4.3. Obligations of the Parties during the At-RequestReview
The obligations of the parties during the Modification
Process of the Trigger-At-Request-Review clauses are
very similar to those in the Periodic Review clauses, in
general a requirement that the parties make any
changes that they agree “in good faith” are
necessary.xix Automatic-At-Request-Review clauses
provide even weaker obligations for the parties to
agree to any modification proposals made by the other
side: “the parties shall take such action, if any, that is
mutually agreed to address the matter.”xx
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Although the above arguments appear reasonable,
depending upon which party is making them and under
which circumstances, a Government is likely reluctant
to sit down with investors to readjust royalties, tax
benefits and the like when prices fall and/or the quality
or quantity of the commodity is less advantageous
than forecast and/or the geology turns out to be much
more difficult than foreseen, and an investor will be
reluctant to discuss with the Government readjusting
financial terms when it is experiencing windfall profits.

The investor’s base line could take the form of a
mathematical formula wherein its numbers affecting
the future profitability of the project are inserted
(CAPEX, OPEX, financial costs not accounted for in
the CAPEX, projected average sale price of
commodity, etc.), to predict a projected ROI during
each of the major phases of the project (which could
be a loss for example for the feasibility and exploration
stage). This method would not necessarily require the
investor to divulge all of the detailed data used to
calculate its projected CAPEX and OPEX, but it would
hold the investor responsible for its projected base line
ROI for each stage of the project, in order to evaluate
whether or not the financial and other conditions of the
contract should be renegotiated.

6. A new approach
6.1. The approach – setting objective criteria
Circumscribing the scope of negotiations and
accusations of the use of unreliable data, by using
objective criteria and supporting financial data to
calculate a base line for the parties’ financial
expectations may increase the chance of success in
Periodic Reviews. The purpose of the base line
calculations is to share the partners’ financial
expectations at the beginning of the project. These
expectations would be reexamined by comparing the
base line figures with actual figures at contractually
defined intervals or at party requested intervals or
both, to ascertain whether circumstances have
resulted in the financial reality for one or several of the
parties being very far off the base line expectations
such that renegotiations are warranted. If the investor’s
projections turn out to be wildly off base, it is likely that
the Government’s revenue projections will be as well,
thereby giving the parties a reality based incentive to
renegotiate.

For the Government, the projections of revenue from
royalties, land fees, taxes etc. and the time line for
their receipt would also be attached to the contractual
framework. The Government calculations will, to a
large extent, rely on the investor’s projections of
quantities, quality and sale price but the Government
could conceivably arrive at its revenue projections
through independent analysis, which is always
preferable to relying solely on the investor’s figures.
6.2. Data required
To ensure reliable long term numbers, the data for
each stage of the project would be input into the
formula during each stage of the project and the
cumulated ROI would be exchanged by the parties at
contractually defined periods during each project stage
or upon the request of one of the parties or both. If the
resulting ROI calculations vary by more than one or
several negotiated fixed percentage(s), the parties
would be obligated to renegotiate in order to attain or
readjust their respective expectations as set forth in
the initial contractual framework. The parties could
also decide to modify the base line figures and the
percentage of difference that will trigger a
renegotiation. Moreover, different percentages could
be used for different stages of the project; if the parties
feel that the application of one sole percentage
(difference of more or less than 10% of the base line
ROI, for example) would not take into account all of the
variables. Furthermore, the percentage should be

The base line calculations would be attached to the
contractual framework when it is first negotiated and
signed. For example, in the Schedule setting out the
investor’s investment requirements (work schedules,
amounts to be invested etc.), the investor could set out
its expected ROI for each phase of the project
(feasibility study, exploration, infrastructure
construction, commercial production and sale phases
of the project etc.). The more information and data
shared by the investor in calculating its ROI, the more
reliable the base line will be.

6

applied in both upturn and downturn situations: ROI
higher or lower than that projected in the contractual
documents.

The same is true for the Government: the calculations
by the Government’s economists of tax and royalty
revenue and other financial considerations must be
taken into account in order to evaluate whether or not
the numbers for the royalty percentage, land fees,
income tax rate calculations etc. are reasonable and
close to accurate or mistaken, grossly erroneous etc.
so that the negotiations can be based on the parties
real interests and not on secret and undocumented
calculations.

The factors which can be renegotiated are numerous:
tax holidays, incentives, rates, customs duties,
depreciation methods, royalty rates, income tax, land
fees, fees on transportation infrastructure (if a fee
sharing method has been adopted for rail cars,
highways etc), when these issues are set forth in
contractual arrangements, rather than in the country’s
law. The permit validity period and work obligations
could also be adjusted to permit a longer (or shorter)
period for the recovery of CAPEX by the investor.

This “mathematical” method would have an additional
advantage of forcing the contracting parties to be
transparent and share their knowledge and financial
expectations.

6.3. Detailed financial information required

6.4. Dealing with confidentiality

A major issue in the negotiation of extractive contracts
is the unequal knowledge base of the contracting
parties. Investors inevitably have more information at
hand to make savvy investment decisions.
Governments, on the other hand, have difficulty getting
evaluations of their mineral or hydrocarbon reserves
from neutral third parties due to cost constraints as
they do not have easy access to the economic and
financial experts needed to construct realistic tax,
royalties, production sharing and other essential
economic and financial projectionsxxi.

A key problem with this approach is convincing
investors to share their information and know-how,
which is often considered proprietary. Certain investors
understandably will not want to divulge such
information. However, if information, data and financial
projections can be “sanitized” and if the other
partners/parties are obliged to respect confidentiality
subject to stiff automatic penalties, there may be room
for the exchange of sufficient data to make this method
work.
For example, the data used to establish feasibility
studies could be licensed to the Government on an
exclusive basis for a modest fee. This could give the
data the intellectual property protections required to
reassure the investor, while giving the Government
access to valuable data concerning its own reserves.
The license fee could be incorporated into the royalty
for a fixed period of time. To make this type of
arrangement work, the investor would have to
communicate to the Government the cost of the
feasibility study so that the Government’s payment for
its use makes commercial sense. Perhaps, the
Government would want to purchase the data and the
feasibility study for its cost plus a small percentage. At
the very least, the parties can give the data and the
feasibility study a value to be taken into account when
calculating the ROI of the investor and the ROI of the
Government.

The primary purpose of setting forth detailed financial
expectations in the contractual framework is to permit
the parties to set a mutually agreed base line for
financial returns for each of the parties. The numbers
and assumptions used by investors and their lenders
to decide whether or not to invest are crucial
information which, if shared in a confidential,
commercially constructive manner, would serve to
build trust between the partners in the investment and
allow for renegotiations based on objective criteria
depending upon the stage of the project and which
party has incurred the cost: the cost of
digging/drilling/excavation, the cost of bringing water
and electricity to the site, the cost of relocating
populations, the quality of the commodity extracted
which will affect its sale price, the actual tonnage
which can be extracted at a reasonable rate of ROI,
the cost of transportation of the commodity to bring it
to sale to third parties etc.
7

7. Conclusions

modify the agreement – no further exploration
contracts can be entered into pursuant to the land use
agreementxxiii. The Mining Sector Business
Association, which is party to the land use agreement
and represents the mining companies, thus has an
interest in reaching an agreement under the Periodic
Review Mechanism if it does not want to harm the
future business of its members.

The analysis shows that the importance of review
provisions rests in their ability to maintain dialogue
between the parties and to create an opening to
discuss changed circumstances and the potential for
revision, in situations that perhaps the parties could
not have listed with any specificity at the outset. The
Periodic Review Mechanisms identified tend to impose
an obligation to discuss; the parties are required to
meet and consult, but there is little obligation for them
to make any changes to the contract during a review.
In many cases the only requirement is that the parties
act in good faith. While the contracts reviewed rarely
define “good faith” in this context, it would be
worthwhile considering how arbitral tribunals have
interpreted this term. Further, most Review
Mechanisms provide for the continuation of the original
contract provisions if the parties fail to agree to any
modification, adding to the lack of bite that some
practitioners attribute to Periodic Review Mechanisms.
The analysis also showed that a number of contracts
contain three separate avenues for consultation
between the parties. Given the absence of obligations
in each to do more than hold good faith discussions,
the question may be raised as to whether the potential
use of three different ineffective procedures is efficient
and constructive..

Further, Periodic Review Mechanisms could define
clear standards and criteria for the parties to follow
during the Modification Process. Some of the Oil
Contracts, notably Oil Contract 4, are more explicit
regarding the intended outcome of a modification
(“offset or alleviate the said economic hardship caused
by such change [PCC]”). Smith and Wells suggest the
following formulation, which provides some parameters
around the issue of determining whether a change
should be made:
“In undertaking such review, the Parties shall
bargain in good faith with a view toward providing
a fair and equitable division of profits in light of the
economic factors prevailing at the time of the
review.
In undertaking such review the Parties shall be
guided by, but not limited to, consideration of the
following factors:

If the parties do wish to ensure that contract
modification is seriously considered during each
consultation, stronger obligations need to be included
during the Modification Process. The review did reflect
some options. As stated above, one clause stipulated
that certain tax exemptions would expire unless they
are renewed by the agreement of the parties during
the review process. This type of clause would provide
impetus to the investor to enter into serious
discussions in relation to the contract terms. Such a
mechanism could potentially be extended to other
provisions of the contract that are perceived as likely to
require adaptation over the duration of the investment,
such as any tax or royalty rate, especially if they are
fixed, and any exemptions.xxii The Periodic Review
Mechanism in the Australian land use agreement (see
Note iv) provides that if the parties fail to reach an
agreement – either to modify the agreement, or not to

1. The economic value of the concession.
2. Terms of other (nickel) agreements negotiated
by the government within the five-year period
preceding the date of review.
3. Terms of other (nickel) agreements negotiated
by the Concessionaire within the five-year period
preceding the date of review.
4. Terms of other (nickel) agreements negotiated
by third parties to the extent that such agreements
can be reasonably compared to this Agreement.”
xxiv

Alternatively, an entirely new approach could be
adopted whereby the parties share, at the outset, their
financial expectations over the course of the project to
create a baseline reflecting these expectations. This
8

baseline can be reviewed over the duration of the
project in order to determine, objectively, whether
there is a need for renegotiation – in cases where
either party’s financial expectations are not being met.

investor, Periodic Review Mechanisms can be used
internally to convince others within the company that
changes are necessary, where they are seen as
desirable for business or political purposes. From this
perspective, the mechanisms can provide a legal
underpinning for parties seeking to achieve a business
or relationship imperative. In any event, the Review
Mechanism may play an important role in managing
the relationship between the parties and in particular in
managing the process of renegotiation. At the very
least, they act to keep the parties talking to each other
over the course of the investment.

Despite their problems, Periodic Review Mechanisms
can still play an important role. These mechanisms can
be the only provision under which a government can
request changes to the terms of the contract where the
balance of benefits changes in light of changed
circumstances. For example, it was suggested by
practitioners that the mechanisms can add legitimacy
to a request by a government for amendments when
changed circumstances in the market result in the
investor receiving an unexpected level of profit. This
contrasts with other mechanisms that often apply
unilaterally to the investor, providing for adjustment to
the contract terms to restore the economic equilibrium
expected under the contract, where there has been a
change (generally government legislation) affecting the
investor’s share of benefits.xxv On the part of the

To better understand the usefulness of the current
form of Periodic Review Mechanisms in practice,
further research could track renegotiations or
attempted renegotiations under contracts that contain
such provisions against those that do not, to observe
the effect of the clause on both the outcome and the
process of renegotiation, as well as the recourse to
arbitration.

The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
(CCSI), a joint center of Columbia Law School
and the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is
a leading applied research center and forum
dedicated to the study, practice and discussion
of sustainable international investment. Our
mission is to develop and disseminate practical
approaches and solutions, as well as to analyze
topical policy-oriented issues, in order to
maximize the impact of international investment
for sustainable development.
www.ccsi.columbia.edu
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Annex 1
Review Mechanisms in Mining Contract 2 and Oil Contract 10
Mining Contract 2 - Section 30 – Periodic Review.
“30.1 Profound Changes in Circumstances. For the purpose of considering Profound Changes in Circumstances
from those existing on the Effective Date or on the date of the most recent review of this Agreement pursuant to
this Section 30, the Government on the one hand and the Concessionaire and the Operating Company jointly on
the other hand, shall at the request of the other consult together. The parties shall meet to review the matter
raised as soon after such request as is reasonably convenient for them both. In case Profound Changes in
Circumstances are established to have occurred, the parties shall effect such change in or clarification of this
Agreement that they in good faith agree is necessary.
30.2 Five Year Review. This Agreement shall be subject to periodic review once every five (5) years after the date
of the start of Production for the purpose of good faith discussions to effect such modifications to this Agreement
as may be necessary or desirable in the light of any substantial changes in circumstances which may have
occurred during the previous five years.
30.3 Other Consultation. In addition to the consultation and review provided by Section 30 [...], each party may at
any time request a consultation with the other party with respect to any matter affecting the rights and obligations
of the parties pursuant to this Agreement or any matter relating to Operations. The parties shall meet to review in
good faith the matter raised as soon after such request as is reasonably convenient for them both. Subsequent to
such consultation, the parties shall take such action, if any, that is mutually agreed to address the matter.”
Oil Contract 10 – Section 36.2 Profound Change in Circumstances
“(a) The State and the Contractor shall meet if the State or the Contractor gives at least forty-five (45) days’
Notice to the other that it reasonably considers a Profound Change in Circumstances to have occurred. At the
meeting, the State and the Contractor shall review the relevant facts and circumstances and determine whether or
not a Profound Change in Circumstances has occurred. To the extent that a Profound Change in Circumstances
has occurred, the State and the Contractor shall enter into good faith discussions to consider and shall make such
modifications to this Contract as they may through good faith discussions propose as necessary or appropriate to
restore the economic, fiscal and financial balance of the Contract…
(c) In addition to the review provided for in Article 36.2(a), the State and the Contractor shall also meet once every
five (5) years after the Effective Date, on at least forty five (45) days’ prior Notice at the request of either, to review
and discuss in good faith issues deemed material to the rights and obligations of the State and the Contractor
pursuant to this Contract by the requesting party. The Parties shall effect such modifications to this Contract that
the Parties in good faith discussions agree are necessary.
(d) In addition to the consultation and review provided by Articles 36.2(a) and 36.2(b), either the State or the
Contractor may at any time request a consultation with the other Party with respect to any matter affecting the
rights and obligations of the State and the Contractor pursuant to this Contract. The State and the Contractor shall
meet reasonably promptly after such request for the requested consultation. Subsequent to such consultation, the
Parties shall take such action, if any, that is in good faith discussions mutually agreed to address the matter.
(e) Any Notice or request under Articles 36.2(a) through 36.2(d), inclusive, shall include a summary statement of
the circumstances giving rise to such Notice or request.
(f) For the purposes of Articles 36.2(a) through 36.2(d), “good faith discussions” and “consultation” shall not
require a Party to agree to any modifications to this Contract and the lack of agreement is not subject to Article 31
[i.e., dispute resolution].
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Annex 2
Contract
N°
1
2

3
4
5

6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17

18
19

20

Mining Contracts

Signing Date

Mineral Development Agreement between The Republic of Liberia
and KPO Resources Incorporated
Mineral Development Agreement between the Government of the
Republic of Liberia, China-Union (Hong Kong) Mining Co., LTD.
And China-Union Investment (Liberia) Bong Mines Co., LTD.
Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia
and African Aura Resources Limited
Iron Ore Exploration Agreement for the Kitoma Range between
The Republic of Liberia and BHP Billiton World Exploration Inc.
An Act Approving the Mining Concession Agreement entered into
by and between Government of the Republic of Liberia and
Bentley International Trading Corporation
Mineral Exploration Agreement II between The Republic of Liberia
and Deveton Mining Company
Iron Ore Appraisal and Mineral Exploration Agreement for the
Putu Range between The Republic of Liberia and Mano River Iron
Ore (Liberia) Inc.
Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia
and Liberty Gold and Diamond Mining Inc.
Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia
and G-10 Exploration Inc.
Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia
and T-REX Resources Inc.
Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia
and Golden Ventures Inc.
Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia
and Amlib United Minerals Inc.
Concession Agreement Between the Republic of Liberia and the
Liberia Company
Mineral Development Between the Government of Liberia and
Bea Mountain
An Act to Ratify The Concession Agreement Between The
Republic of Liberia and Western Cluster Limited, Sesa Gao
Limited, Bloom Fountain Limited, And Elenilto Minerals And
Mining LLC
Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia
and Magma Mineral Resources Inc
An Act Ratifying the Amendment to the Mineral Development
Agreement (MDA) Dated August 17, 2005 between The
Government of the Republic of Liberia (The Government) and
Mittal Steel Holding A. G. and Mittal Steel (Liberia) Holdings
Limited (The Concessionaire)
Mineral Exploration Agreement between The Republic of Liberia
and Craton Developments Inc.
Iron Ore Appraisal and Mineral Exploration Agreement for the
Goe-Fantro Range between The Republic of Liberia and BHP
Billiton World Exploration Inc.
Mineral Development Agreement Between The Government of
the Republic of Liberia and BHP Billiton Iron Ore Holdings

November 28, 2001

11

January 19, 2009

March 14, 2002
May 11, 2005
May 23, 1978

September 22, 2005
May 18, 2005

October 26, 2005
October 26, 2005
October 20, 2005
0ctober 26, 2005
March 14, 2002
?
November 28, 2001
August 22, 2011

October 26, 2005
December 28, 2006

October 26, 2005
April 22, 2005

September 16, 2010

Contract
N°
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Oil Contracts

Signing Date

An Act Ratifying the Production Sharing Contract Between the
National Oil Company of Liberia, Oranto & Chevron-LB 14
Second Addendum
Production Sharing Contract Between GOL, Regal Liberia Ltd &
Hydrocarbons Ltd.

September 3, 2010

An Act Ratifying the Production Sharing Contract With
Addendum for Offshore Liberia Blocks LB 16 & 17 Signed
Between the Republic of Liberia Represented by the National Oil
Company of Liberia (NOCAL) and REPSOL Exploration S.A.
An Act Ratifying the Production Sharing Contract With
Addendum for Offshore Liberia Blocks LB 15 Signed Between
the Republic of Liberia Represented by the National Oil
Company of Liberia (NOCAL) and Woodside West Africa PTY.
LTD.
Production Sharing Contract Between The republic of Liberia and
Hongkong Tongtai Petroleum International Corporation Ltd for
Offshore Block LB6 and for Block LB7
An Act to Ratify the Production Sharing Contract for Block LB-10
Signed Between the National Oil Company of Liberia (NOCOL)
on Behalf of the Republic of Liberia and Anadarko Liberia Block
10 Company
An Act Ratifying the Production Sharing Contract With
Addendum for Blocks LB 13 Signed Between the National Oil
Company of Liberia (NOCAL) on Bahalf of the Republic of
Liberia and Broadway Consolidated PLC
An Act to Ratify the Production Sharing Contract With Addendum
for Block LB 11 and 12 Signed Between the National Oil
Company of Liberia (NOCOL) on Behalf of the Republic of
Liberia and Oranto Petroleum Limited
An Act to Ratify the Production Sharing Contract Between the
National Oil Company of Liberia (NOCOL) Representing the
Republic of Liberia and Oranto Petroleum Limited for Offshore
Block LB 14
Block 13 as amended and restated in 2013 for Exxon

12

March 11, 2008,
approved by
President
August 17, 2005

March 11, 2009

Draft

July 23, 2009

May 31, 2005

April 16, 2007

July 23, 2009

March 8, 2013

Notes
xvii

Oil Contract 2, Article 35.3.
Oil Contract 10, Article 36.2(b): “For the purposes of
this Article 36.2, “Profound Change in Circumstances”
means such changes […] in the economic conditions of
the petroleum industry worldwide or in Liberia, or such
changes in the economic, political or social circumstances
existing in Liberia specifically or elsewhere in the world at
large as to result in such a material and fundamental
alteration of the conditions, assumptions and bases relied
upon by the Parties at the Relevant Date that the overall
economic, fiscal and financial balance reasonably
anticipated by them will no longer as a practical matter be
achievable.”
xix
Some Oil Contracts provide additional details and
specify “that the economic benefits to the Parties shall not
be reduced as a result of exercising the terms of this
Article” (Oil Contract 2, Article 35.3., 2005). While the aim
is to restore the equilibrium that was initially intended by
the parties the re-equilibration is not automatic, but subject
to the agreement of the parties. Other contracts require
the parties to “make the necessary revisions and
adjustments to this Contract in order to offset or alleviate
the said economic hardship caused by such change,
maintain such expected economic benefits to each of the
parties, recognizing the risk which is it has been
undertaken by the Contractor under this Contract,
provided that the economic benefits to the Parties shall not
be reduced as a result of exercising the terms if this
Article.” (Oil Contract 4, Article 35.3.).
xx
Mining Contract 2.
xviii

i

David N. Smith and Louis T. Wells Jr., Negotiating Third
World Mineral Agreements, Promises as Prologue
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1975).
ii
Petrocash legal database, available at:
http://www.petrocash.com/Legal/ (last visited Mar 6,
2014), and contracts collected by CCSI.
iii
See http://www.leiti.org.lr/ (last visited Mar 6, 2014). For
the purpose of this analysis, the contracts were
categorized and numbered as set out in Annex 2.
iv
The MMDA contains a model Periodic Review
Mechanism and provides four examples, one of which
comes from a Liberian contract and one of which is taken
from the Australian Adnyamathanha Body Corporate
Indigenous Land Use Agreement (available at:
http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/1756
71/Adnyamathanha_Minerals_Exploration_ILUA_13.2.12.
pdf ). The source of these other clauses in the MMDA is
unknown. The Periodic Review Mechanism in the
Australian contract is conceptually different from the
Liberian mechanisms. Unlike the Liberian mechanisms, it
is not part of an investment contract but found in a land
use agreement in which the parties agree to consent to
the grant of authorized exploration contracts (clause
3.1(a)(i)). The government of South Australia has
published three additional land use agreements with
similar periodic review mechanisms.
v
Tanzania Mining Code, Part II, 12 provides for periodic
review: “The development agreement entered into under
section 10 shall be subject to periodic performance review
by parties after every five years”.
vi
By September 25, 2013, LEITI had published and
categorized over 119 contracts according to their industry:
76 forestry contracts, 19 Mining Contracts, 14 agriculture
contracts and nine Oil Contracts. For this analysis, we
analyzed one additional mining contract and one
additional oil contract that were not published by LEITI.
vii
Mining Contracts 1, 2, 5, 12, 14, 15, 17.
viii
Oil Contracts 5 and 10.

xxi

Whereas pro bono legal experts exist, it is not easy to
find qualified pro bono economic and financial experts.
xxii
See Mining Contract 5.
xxiii
2.2(e)(i): If no agreement has been made “no accepted
exploration contract may be entered into pursuant to
clause 5.1 of the exploration contract conditions”. In this
example, however, the rights and obligations of the parties
to existing exploration contracts are not impacted:
2.2(f)(ii): 2.2(e) “does not in any way affect […] any
accepted exploration contracts entered into prior to the
relevant date.”
xxiv
Smith and Wells Jr., 1975, op. cit.
xxv
Such as stabilization clauses, including freezing
clauses and economic balancing clauses. For a
description of these clauses, see for example: Frank
Alexander, “Comment on articles on stabilization by Piero
Bernardini, Lorenzo Cotula and AFM Maniruzzaman”,
Journal of World Energy Law & Business (2009) Vol. 2,
No. 3, p. 244.

ix

In Mining Contract 5b the interval is “not less than every
7 years”.
x
Mining Contract 1, 2, 12, 14, 20, and 15, which specifies
“or earlier” and is therefore similar to Mining Contract 5;
Oil Contract 5, Article 36.3., and Oil Contract 10, Article
36.2(c). Oil Contract 10 also specifies a 45-day notice
period.
xi
Mining Contract 2, Article 30.2: “This Agreement shall be
subject to periodic review once every (5) years after the
date of the start of Production for the purpose of good faith
discussions to effect such modifications to this Agreement
as may be necessary or desirable in the light of any
substantial changes in circumstances which may have
occurred during the previous five years.”
xii
Mining Contracts 15 and 20.
xiii
Mining Contract 1, Article 35.1.: “It is understood that
this clause subjects the Parties to a simple obligation to
consider in good faith the proposed modification of the
Agreement […] This Agreement shall remain unaltered
and in force during any such period of consideration.”
xiv
Mining Contract 5, Article 33.
xv
Model Mine Development Agreement 1.0., Clause 36.0.
Australian land use agreement is example 4.
xvi
Oil Contract 10, Article 36.2(f).
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